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ECONOMY-WIDE INFLUENCES ON RURAL FINANCIAL 
MARKET PERFORMANCE 
By 
Compton Bourne 
University of the West Indies 
The viability of rural credit institutions and programs is an 
important item on the policy agenda of Caribbean governments, regional 
agencies, and the credit institutions themselves. Among many decision-
makers there is genuine concern about the performance of rural credit 
programs. Financial advisers have been provided for some struggling 
institutions in the East Caribbean Common Market. Programs have been 
redesigned in others. In Jamaica there is even an active movement towards 
the merger of several public sector programs and institutions. 
These policy concerns and related initiatives are commendable. 
Nonetheless, they reveal one serious policy limitation, namely that 
problem diagnoses and solutions are almost always entirely within the 
context of the credit programs themselves. This paper advances the thesis 
that developments in the wider economy have a major influence on the 
viability of rural credit institutions and programs. Correspondingly, 
appropriate policy approaches should be less narrow in scope, encompassing 
the real sector and not confined to the financial sector or parts thereof. 
The remainder of the paper elaborates on the importance of the wider 
policy approach, outlines the main channels of economy-wide influences, and 
by reference to Jamaica comments on their likely significance in the 
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Commonwealth Caribbean. Because public sector institutions and programs 
are not the only or even the largest creditors in the rural financial 
markets, the ensuing discussion is formulated in terms of rural financial 
markets to allow treatment of matters more germane to private financial 
institutions. 
Why Consider Economy-Wide Influences 
Financial markets are expected to contribute to rural development by 
improving the quantity and quality of rural savings, and by the provision 
of credit in amounts and forms that enhance productive capacity and rural 
equity. Evidence for a few countries leads to the conclusion that rural 
financial markets are not fulfilling these expectations in the CARICOM 
countries (see for Example Bourne 1976, Graham, Bourne and Begashaw 1978, 
Bourne and Graham 1980, Graham and Bourne 1980, and Weir et al 1980). 
Financial savings have not grown significantly in constant prices. Poor 
loan repayment performance and problems of funding have also prevented the 
sustained growth of rural credit. In several countries, such as Montserrat, 
St. Kitts-Nevis, St. Vincent, Dominica, and Jamaica, rural financial 
markets are in a state of acute depression. 
Among the various approaches that might be taken to diagnose 
problems in the viability and performance of rural financial markets are 
indepth analyses of specific programs and institutions. Such studies 
invariably highlight the weakness of program design and managerial skills, 
poor coordination with other policies, ill-defined or inconsistent 
objectives, and too rapid changes in the size and composition of credit 
programs in the context of limited managerial skills and resources. Policy 
measures which emerge from intra project evaluations emphasize the need 
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for innovations in deposit facilities and savings mobilisation (Adams 
1978, Bourne and Graham 1980), better credit delivery systems (Adams and 
Ladman 1979), improved credit appraisal and more effective loan 
monitoring and recovery procedures (Bourne 1976, Graham, Bourne, Begashaw 
1978, Graham and Bourne 1980). The need to institute more flexible 
interest rate policies, in order to reduce the wide gap between low 
lending rates and high lending costs is frequently advised (Adams 1979, 
Datey 1978, Graham and Bourne 1980, Bourne 1980). Together, these intra-
project reforms are expected to guarantee a viable, self-sustaining set of 
financial programs. 
For the most part these policy recommendations are based on sound 
diagnoses. However, there usually is not sufficient recognition of the 
influence of the overall economic environment on rural financial market 
performance and on the efficacy of financial market reforms. A rural 
financial market is not an isolated set of institutions, transactors, 
and financial activities. It is a component of the total financial sector 
which is itself one of several sectors in the economy. Though functional 
and institutional fragmentation of the financial sector is characteristic 
of Caribbean economies, there are strong linkages between constituent 
elements of the financial sector and the rest of the economy. These links 
ensure that developments in rural financial markets both condition and 
are conditioned by developments in the wider economy. More usually, the 
influence of the latter is stronger and decisive. 
An appreciation of interconnections is necessary for effective 
policy formulation at both the national economic and the financial 
institution levels. National and sectoral planners need to keep in mind 
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the economic interrelatedness if the risks of policy inconsistencies and 
unintended consequences are to be minimised. Top decision-makers in 
financial institutions need to convey the sectoral and market incidence 
of macroeconomic policy to macro-planners who think primarily in global 
terms. 
How Economy-Wide Factors Affect Rural Financial Markets 
The continued viability of rural financial institutions is an 
essential requirement for the achievement of the socio-economic objectives 
usually set for rural financial markets. Institutional survival and 
growth is necessary for the maintenance and expansion of financial 
programs. Accordingly, viability and growth are crucial indicators of 
rural financial market performance. Therefore, the influence of economy-
wide factors can be examined in terms of their consequences for institu-
tional viability and growth. 
The crucial financial market variables are lending resources and the 
realized operating margin of rural lenders. These variables crystallize 
the outcome of more basic forces operating on both sides of the financial 
markets. Lending resources are increased by equity, debt and deposit 
liabilities, and decreased by the diversion of these capital inflows to 
operating expenditures. Realized operating margins are affected by 
interest and non-interest operating costs, by loan defaults, and by interest 
and other operating income. Savings and debt transactions constitute the 
link between these variables and rural non-financial enterprises. Savings 
and debt repayments contribute to loanable resources, while dis-savings 
and debt default have the opposite effect. Likewise, loan delinquency and 
' 
' 
• 
' 
-5-
default increases lending costs andreducesnet revenue. The channels of 
influence of economy-wide variables on these financial market operations 
will be discussed now. Five broad sets of economy-wide factors are 
considered: the general price level, product price policies, trade and 
foreign exchange policies, interest rate policies, and non-price credit 
restraint policies. Each is discussed in turn though they might operate 
simultaneously. 
The General Price Level 
The general price level can exert an influence on rural financial 
markets through the cost and revenue (or profit) functions of market 
transactors. If factor prices are indexed to the general price level, 
then changes in domestic price inflation will cause changes in wages and 
other factor costs of financial institutions and non-financial enterprises. 
However, these changes will most likely be asymmetric: domestic price 
inflation spilling over into cost increases for financial market transactors, 
but domestic price deflation unaccompanied by cost reductions. Unless 
the financial market transactors increase their product prices (i.e. loan 
charges and commodity prices) and/or improve total factor productivity, 
operating margins will be reduced by domestic price inflation. A prof its 
squeeze may exert further depressing effects on financial institutions by 
reducing the capacity and willingness of non-financial enterprises and 
individuals to save and to repay debt. Resources inflows may thus be 
adversely affected and loan delinquency problems arise. 
' 
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The strength and direction of the link between the domestic price 
level and factor costs are critical. Labour in the formal financial 
markets of the Commonwealth Caribbean is highly unionized. Aggressive 
unionism ensures that labour costs adjust fairly rapidly to general price 
increases. Further, despite the overall weaker degree of unionization in 
rural commodity sub-sectors, some segments of the labour market, e.g. 
plantation agriculture, are no less highly unionised than urban centered 
industries. Wages-spread and spillover mechanisms link wage rates in the 
two 'strongly unionized' and the non-unionized segments so that the 
unionized wage rate pulls up the non-unionized wage rate. The other factor 
markets tend to be oligopolistic or monopolistic, with suppliers of 
capital and intermediate inputs seeming to adjust their own product prices 
rapidly to price level increases in accordance with a full-cost pricing 
rule. 
The role of real income in financial savings decisions is also 
important. The Caribbean consensus is that real income is the single most 
significant influence on domestic savings. Price level effects via changes 
in real income can therefore be expected to strongly influence the flow of 
loanable funds in rural financial institutions. 
Product Prices 
For generalised inflation to exert a prof its squeeze on rural financial 
markets, the prices of credit and commodities must rise less rapidly than 
factor costs. There are several reasons for expecting such an outcome. 
The loan charges of public sector credit institutions are subject to 
governmental directives andare often specified in contracts with external 
funding agencies. Loan rates of interest and fees are usually not only low 
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but rigid. Even under mild inflations, the rate of general price increases 
(and therefore cost increases) tend to exceed interest rate increases in 
public sector financial institutions. Private financial institutions 
mainly commercial banks, are not so severely affected through this channel 
since in most Commonwealth Caribbean countries they are free to increase 
loan rates of interest. However, the interest elasticity of loan demand 
places a market limit on the degree of upward interest rate revisions. As a 
consequence, private financial institutions also experience a cost squeeze 
under rapid inflation. 
The main limitation on commodity price increases grows out of official 
price control policies. In pursuit of cheap food objectives, price controls 
are imposed on domestic farm products and on competing imported foodstuf_fs. 
Where the price of the domestic product is uncontrolled, but the price of 
the imported competitive commodity is set substantially below the price 
of the local farm commodity, a profits squeeze may still result. The 
'cheaper' import either displaces the local product and has a quantity 
effect on gross revenues, or forces lower prices and has a price effect 
on the gross revenues of the domestic producer. Even where price controls 
are revised upwards to take account of increases in production costs, 
adjustment is usually not full and moreover is protracted. In such 
circumstances, some profits depression still occurs. 
Interest Rates 
Financial markets in the Commonwealth Caribbean are subject to 
interest rate regulation as already noted in the case of loan rates of 
interest. There is no need to repeat the discussion on loan rates. Instead, 
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attention is directed to interest rate policies as they affect other assets 
and liabilities. 
A financial institution is a multiproduct firm, providing a mix of 
financial credits at several prices. Its overall rate of return depends on 
the output of each credit-product and the price thereon. Commercial banks 
lend to non-rural enterprises and to government (either by direct loan or 
purchase of government debt instruments). Accordingly their overall income 
is affected by the rates of interest prevailing on these non-rural credits. 
Similarly, public sector credit agencies mainly for liquidity and capital 
purposes maintain a portfolio of market investment assets, essentially 
commercial bank deposits and government debt instruments. 
Official policies have tended to keep the interest costs of 
government debt at a low level. Legal reserve requirements generate a 
compulsory demand for government debt among commercial banks. Moral 
suasion serves the same purpose among public sector credit institutions. 
Partly because interest rates on savings instruments have been 
depressed for so long at such low levels, there is virtually no conclusive 
evidence on the likely effect of interest rate increases on savings in the 
Commonwealth Caribbean. The most that can be said is that thus far savings 
have not diminished significantly in response to the prevailing negative 
rates of interest. But this fact does not imply the converse, namely that 
substantial interest rate increases would not induce a substantially larger 
volume of savings. If savings are interest-sensitive, then the overall 
trend in savings rates of interest will influence the volume of funds 
mobilised locally by the commercial banks and other institutions that accept 
deposits. It remains to be said, also, that higher interest rates on deposits 
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' imply higher lending costs for rural financial institutions. The savings 
rate of interest thus exerts its influence through the cost functions of 
' 
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rural financial institutions as well as through their lending capacity. 
These sources of influence are not particularly germane for public 
sector credit agencies which obtain their loanable resources primarily 
from external donor agencies, local governments, and quasi-governmental 
institutions, though they are affected to the extent that they borrow from 
private financial institutions which accept local deposits. Private 
financial institutions are the ones most affected by the national 
behaviour of rates of interest on savings instruments. 
Credit Restrictions 
Quantitative credit restrictions are frequently imposed in pursuit 
of sectoral and global economic planning objectives. They tend to have 
an uneven impact on financial institutions within the financial sector as 
a whole as well as within the rural financial sub-sector. Public sector 
institutions are usually not subject to credit restraints. In contrast, 
private financial institutions may have to observe ceilings on their 
lending in total and to specific borrowing categories or economic sectors. 
More usually the restricted categories are among the more lucrative assets. 
One effect of these restraints therefore is to reduce the earning potential 
of the overall financial asset portfolio. Because of the rigidities in 
cost structures arising from the contractual nature of time deposits, 
these institutions will experience short run reductions in earnings 
relative to costs unless loan rates of interest are sufficiently 
increased. 
' 
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On the borrowers' side of the market, global credit restraint may 
impart a liquidity squeeze, depending on the degree to which borrowing 
enterprises are reliant on banks for their working capital. The 
liquidity squeeze would be even greater if the credit contraction 
coincides with downward pressures on current profits and savings. These 
liquidity problems may easily spill over to lending institutions in the 
form of,loan delinquency and, in extreme cases, in loan default. 
Trade and Foreign Exchange 
Foreign trade and foreign exchange developments influence rural 
financial market performance through their effects on the cost, production 
and revenue functions of financial and non-financial enterprises, and 
their effects on debt costs. 
Import prices are an important component of factor costs in highly 
open economies. Import prices generate increases in the prices of raw 
materials and capital goods, and also in wage rates via changes in the 
cost of living. Changes in import prices (in domestic currency) are 
determined partly by changes in the exchange rate, and partly by changes 
in foreign export prices. For some Caribbean countries, e.g. Jamaica, 
exchange rate changes have been dominant in recent years. To the extent 
that rural product prices and financial product prices do not keep pace 
with factor cost increases induced by import prices, the net revenue 
functions of rural lenders and borrowers are adversely affected. 
Quantitative import restrictions can also affect profitability and 
gross revenues at the enterprise level. Depending on the import-
coefficient of production and on the scope for substituting local inputs, 
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restraints on imports of producer goods reduce production levels and 
efficiency with obvious consequences for gross and net revenues. 
The debt cost consequences of exchange rate changes stem from the 
fact that some proportion of rural financial market liabilities are 
denominated in foreign currencies. Therefore, the local currency capital 
value equivalent of these debts varies directly with the direction and 
magnitude of change in the exchange rate. Devaluation increases the 
capital value of the debt in local currency while revaluation does the 
opposite. Increases in the capital values of the credit agencies' 
liabilities will lead either to increases in loan charges if prof it 
margins are to be protected, or to some institutional decapitalization 
if profit margins are allowed to fall. A negative influence on institu-
' 
tional performance is also possible through the repercussions of 
devaluation on non-financial debtor behaviour. If debtors respond to the 
discontinuous increase in debt costs by loan delinquency and/or default, 
lending costs will rise to the detriment of the lending agency. 
Economy-Wide Factors in Rural Financial Market Depression: 
A Jamaican Case Study 
The Jamaican economy can be used to illustrate some of the mechanisms 
identified in the preceding section. The economy collapsed from a 
situation of_ positive growth of real gross domestic product averaging 
5 percent per annum between 1965 and 1972 to an uninterrupted succession 
of negative annual growth rates ranging from 1 to 8 percent between 1974 
and 1978. 
Prolonged balance of payments problems, manifested by a movement from 
' 
net foreign reserves of J$132 million in 1971 to minus J$196 million in 1977, 
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resulted in increasingly severe corrective policies of quantitative 
restrictions on imports, exchange rate devaluations totalling 54 per cent 
between 1970 and 1978, and domestic credit restraint. The economy is 
heavily reliant on imports for its supply of consumer and producer goods, 
with imports averaging 41 per cent of gross national expenditure over the 
period. Consequently, domestic prices are highly responsive to changes in 
import prices. The rate of inflation has risen sharply, averaging 15 percent 
during the 1970s, and was as high as 27 percent in 1978. Labor is highly 
unionized in all productive sectors, excluding domestic agriculture. Wage 
rates have generally kept pace with domestic price inflation. 
The poor performance of the real sector was accompanied by serious 
problems within the financial sector, including the rural financial market. 
The rural financial market will now be briefly described, and its 
depression indexed. 
The institutional complex that comprises the Jamaican rural financial 
market includes eight commercial banks operating a country-wide network 
of branches, and two specialized government-owned credit agencies, namely 
the Jamaica Development Bank and the Agricultural Credit Board. Commercial 
banks are the largest single source of credit as well as the main savings 
institutions. The Agricultural Credit Board is a non-deposit taking 
institution established solely for the purpose of making direct loans to 
large farmers and institutional loans to the national network of People's 
Cooperative Banks, which in turn make small loans to small farmers. The 
People's Cooperative Banks also mobilize rural savings but on a very small 
scale. The Jamaica Development Bank, established in 1969, is funded 
mainly through capital subscriptions and loans from the Jamaica Government 
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and from loans from foreign aid agencies. The Jamaica Development Bank 
operates a conunercial loan window for medium to large farmers and, through 
an affiliated agency i.e. the Self-Supporting Farmers Development Program, 
maintains a loan facility for small to medium sized farmers. The Ministry 
of Agriculture provides rural credit services under several ad hoc programs, 
the most recent and important being the Crop Lien Program launched in 1977 
to provide production loans to domestic foodcrop producers. Other 
financial institutions, such as building societies and life insurance 
companies, and informal groups such as rotating credit associations and 
credit unions complete the institutional structure of the rural financial 
market in Jamaica. While the rural savings and credit activities of the 
latter set of transactors cannot be precisely quantified, it does appear 
that most rural savings and credit are channelled through the commercial 
' 
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banks and specialized government programs. The ensuing discussion of 
rural financial market depression is focused on the conunercial banks, the 
Jamaica Development Bank and the Self-Supporting Farmers Development 
Program. 
In keeping with the emphasis on institutional viability and growth, 
four pertinent indicators of financial market performance are the behaviour 
of savings, credit, loan repayments, and profitability. Time series 
estimates of rural savings in Jamaica are not available. However, the 
behaviour of commercial bank total savings and time deposits provides 
some insight into the trends in rural savings mobilization. Real savings 
and time deposits after rising from J$223 million in 1970 to J$298 million 
in 1972, declined by 18 percent over the next two years, recovered slightly 
in 1975 and 1976, only to decline by roughly 7 percent in 1977. Overall, 
real savings at commercial banks stagnated from 1973 to 1978. Therefore, 
' 
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it can be inferred that the savings side of the Jamaican rural financial 
market did not perform well during this period. 
Rural credit, having expanded rapidly early in the 1970s, tended 
to decline after 1974. Real credit balances totalled $29 million in 1970, 
$35 m. in 1974, and $43 m. in 1978. The annual growth rate of credit 
(measured in constant 1970 prices) fell, negative growth being experienced 
in 1974 and dramatically so in 1978. The ratio of rural credit to 
agricultural gross domestic product at factor cost exhibits the same 
pattern as the dollar values of rural credit, i.e. a rise and then a 
decline. 
Loan repayment data is not available for a sufficient number of years 
to permit similar trend analyses for loan repayment performance. However, 
the available information reveals a very unsatisfactory situation in 1977 
and 1978 (Graham, Bourne, Begashaw). The ratio of arrears to payments 
due to Jamaica Development Bank commercial window loans reached system 
collapse levels of 81 and 83 percent in 1977 and 1978 respectively. The 
arrears ratio for the Self Supporting Farmers Development Program was as 
high as 38 percent in 1978. The connnercial banks, largely because of their 
more stringent loan appraisal and recovery practices and their early write-
off policy for bad debt, managed to keep their arrears ratio down to 
4 percent in 1978. However, commercial banks did experience serious 
repayment problems. Their allowances for losses and bad debts as a 
proportion of total current operating expenses rose from an average of 
4 percent between 1970 to 1975 to 6 percent between 1976 and 1977, and 
even higher to 11 percent in 1978. While these statistics on commercial 
bank performance do not pertain to agricultural loans exclusively, one may 
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infer from these data that comrnercial banks, like the public sector credit 
agencies, were experiencing difficulties in recovering rural loans. 
There is no question that the prof its performance of rural credit 
institutions deteriorated during the period analysed. The Jamaica 
Development Bank's ratio of operating income to total expenses tended 
towards 1.0 between 1971 and 1975, but decreased drastically to 0.3 by 
1977. The commercial banks' ratio declined from 1.18 in 1970 to 0.98 in 
1978. 
The evidence on these financial indicators leads inescapably to the 
conclusion that Jamaican rural financial markets were very depressed in 
the 1970s, particularly in the latter half of the decade. Graham, Bourne 
and Begashaw have demonstrated that weaknesses in the design, implementation, 
and monitoring of rural credit programs explain much of this poor performance. 
However, these factors operating on the supply side, i.e. financial 
institutional side, do not fully account for the dismal experience. Events 
within the overall economy seriously contributed to the difficulties 
experienced within the rural financial sector. The importance of these 
more general influences will now be demonstrated. 
The price behaviour of the economy contributed to the debt repayment 
problems experienced by Jamaican farmers. Domestic price inflation was 
rapid~ averaging between 15 and 17 percent per annum during the decade. 
On the basis of the wage-price relationship prevailing in this economy, 
one could infer that agricultural wage rates along with other wage rates 
rose rapidly in response to the inflation of consumer prices. Annual wage 
settlements for all sectors of the economy during the period 1971 to 1976 
ranged between 18 and 45 percent. Economy-wide labor incomes per worker 
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increased annually by an average of 10 percent. Agricultural incomes kept 
pace with the economy-wide trends. While no details are available on 
agricultural wage rates specifically, per worker compensation of employees 
in the agricultural sector rose by an average of 18 percent over the 
period, exceeding the national rate of increase of income per worker in 
1975 and 1978. 
The price of capital services also increased significantly over the 
period. The import price index rose by an average of 23 percent per annum. 
The annual increases were particularly large in 1973, 1974, 1977 and 1978. 
Substantial exchange rate devaluations occurred in the first and last two 
of these four years, while in 1974 OPEC raised petroleum prices substantially. 
Further, more direct support for the contention that the price of capital 
services increased greatly is provided by the data on unit prices of 
imported chemical fertilizers. The annual increases averaged 28 percent, 
and in 1974 more than doubled, again largely as a result of OPEC's impact 
on the price of petroleum and petroleum-based products. It can be concluded, 
therefore, that the price of capital services depressed gross agricultural 
profits. 
These factor price trends do not appear to have been off set by 
increases in farm productivity. In the export sector, the index of tons 
of cane harvested per acre declined almost continuously from 100 in 1970 
to 85 in 1977. Productivity per acre in domestic agriculture remained 
roughly the same from 1971 to 1976, but seems to have risen significantly 
in 1977 and 1978. 
Quantitative restrictions also reduced farm profits. Import 
licensing became increasingly widespread and severe, with consequent 
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reductions in the availability of producer goods. For example, the 
quantity index of fertilizer imports declined by 11 percent in 1974, and 
then again by 6 percent in 1976 and 22 percent in 1977. The smaller 
supplies of improved inputs must have adversely affecte~ production and 
r 
productivity, and thereby farm revenues. The index of domestic food crop 
production declined slightly from 149 in 1972 and did not regain that 
level again until 1977 and 1978 when the massive governmental credit 
and physical support under the Emergency Production Plan succeeded in 
raising the index to 180 and 228 respectively. During this period, output 
decreased for the major agricultural export commodities, i.e. sugar and 
bananas by between 33 and 42 percent, and for quantitatively minor export 
commodities such as coffee. 
Given these adverse trends in factor prices, output, and productivity, 
' 
it is necessary to review the behaviour of agricultural commodity prices. 
It can be deduced that export prices rose on average more slowly than factor 
prices, adjusted for productivity declines. For instance, average annual 
percentage increases in the export prices of sugar and bananas, the two 
main export crops, were 20 and 18 percent respectively compared to an 
average annual price increase of 28 percent for fertilizers. Domestic 
agriculture seems to have fared no better, since there was only an average 
annual percentage increase of 20 percent for domestic farm-gate prices. 
It should be noted that farm-gate prices actually declined in 1978. 
The preceding analysis leads to the conclusion that the increases 
in product prices did not totally offset increases in factor prices, nor 
production and productivity declines. Consequently gross profits were 
seriously squeezed. Direct evidence on profits reinforces this conclusion. 
' •
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The National Income and Product Accounts provide data on a reasonable proxy 
for profits, namely real operating surplus defined as value added minus 
net labor, tax, and capital consumption expenditures. The real operating 
surplus of the agricultural sector declined by 5 percent in 1974, 4 percent 
in 1975 and 8 percent in 1978. Altogether agricultural gross profits fell 
by an average of 3 percent per annum between 1970 and 1978. 
The lower levels of gross income flows occurred at times when price 
trends in the economy increased the money value of farm household purchases. 
Unless farmers were willing to accept substantially lower real levels of 
consumption, the rapid rate of consumer price inflation would result in 
larger money allocations to farm household consumption. No data is 
presently available on farm consumption expenditures specifically. 
However, the National Accounts data reveal that aggregate real private 
consumption expenditures did not fall until 1977 and 1978 when decreases 
of 4 and 10 percent were recorded. Most likely, farm families shared that 
experience. 
Though it is not possible to be categorical about factor cost 
developments among the lending agencies, the evidence does suggest that 
these costs rose in response to the general inflationary trends in the 
economy. Labour costs in the commercial banking industry quintupled 
between 1970 and 1978, as did non-interest expenses of the Jamaica 
Development Bank. 
The earnings performance of the commercial banks was significantly 
affected by official financial policies. Legal reserve requirements were 
frequently revised upwards, moving from 15 percent in 1969 to 29.5 percent 
• 
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in 1977. Government direct borrowing from the commercial banks also 
increased. As a consequence, total commercial bank lending to government 
increased from 11 percent of bank assets in 1970 to 33 percent in 1977. 
At the same time, quantitative restrictions were placed on commercial bank 
lending to the private sector, particularly for consumption and import 
trade. Since the interest rate on government debt instruments and on 
direct debt were substantially lower than that on private debt, the income 
earning potential of commercial banks was continuously being undermined 
by these credit market policies. The negative tendencies were reinforced 
by the reduced demand for bank loans caused by the foreign exchange 
restrictions on import demand. Extensive foreign exchange rationing 
severely contracted the demand for bank credit among distributors and 
consumers. 
' 
It has been argued so far that changes in product and factor prices, 
• 
output, and productivity contributed to rural financial market depression 
by substantially reducing the capacity of farmers to save, make profitable 
investments, and to repay debt. The influence of credit policies and 
trade policies on credit agencies was also dealt with. It will now be 
shown that debt service and amortization requirements also increased. 
Commercial banks increased their loan rates of interest in an 
attempt to moderate the decline in net earnings caused by lower volumes 
of lending. On average, their nominal loan rates during 1974 to 1978 
were three index points higher than rates in the 1970 to 1974 period 
(Bank of Jamaica Annual Reports). Loan charges of public sector credit 
agencies remained the same (Graham, Bourne, Begashaw). However, given the 
' 
' 
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large share of commercial banks in rural credit, overall rural loan rates 
of interest were pulled upwards. 
Furthermore, frequent exchange rate devaluations, totalling 54 percent 
between 1970 and 1978, increased the local currency value of debt financed 
from foreign funds. Farmers are required to maintain the foreign currency 
values of such loans made by the Jamaica Development Bank. Consequently, 
exchange rate devaluation abruptly increases the local currency costs of 
these debts. Foreign funds comprised between 33 and 67 percent of loans 
extended by the Jamaica Development Bank during the period 1970 to 1978. 
Farm credit extended by other institutions are not based on foreign funds and 
consequently have been unaffected by the recent devaluations. Nonetheless, 
given the share of the Jamaica Development Bank program in the total supply 
of rural credit, a substantial proportion of farm debt must have been 
adversely affected. 
Conclusion 
This paper has dealt with the influence of economy-wide factors on 
rural financial market performance. The main channels of influence running 
from the general price level, product prices, credit market variables, and 
the foreign sector to the lending position and viability of rural credit 
institutions were outlined. The explanation of Jamaican rural financial 
market depression in these terms emphasizes the importance of the overall 
economic framework and policy measures taken outside rural financial 
markets • 
.. ' • 
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